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ABSTRACT
In this paper we develop a theory of how factors interact at the plant level. The theory has
implications for: (1) the micro foundations for capital skill complementarity (2) the relationship
between factor allocation and plant size and (3) the effects of trade and growth on the skill premium.
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In this paper we develop a theory of how factors interact at the plant level. The theory has
implications for (1) the relationship between factor allocation and plant size, (2) the micro
foundations for capital-skill complementarity, and (3) the eﬀects of trade and growth on the
skill premium. The theory is consistent with certain facts about factor allocation and factor
price changes in the 19th and 20th centuries.
The main idea in our theory is that there is an analogy between the way capital relates to
unskilled labor and the way unskilled labor relates to skilled labor. Capital can do relatively
simple mechanical tasks that unskilled labor would otherwise do, but only if high setup costs
are incurred. Analogously, unskilled labor can do complex brain tasks skilled labor would
otherwise do, but only if high setup costs are incurred.
To explain, consider a simple mechanical task such as emptying the trash or moving a
box from point A to point B. Unskilled labor has general ability to undertake such simple
tasks. An unskilled worker hired just ﬁve minutes ago could ﬁrst empty the trash and then
move a box with virtually no training. It may be possible to obtain a machine to take out
the trash, but this would in general require extensive setup costs, for example, construction
of a conveyer belt that would have to be designed to ﬁt a particular space. Moreover, we
expect that a diﬀerent machine would have to be obtained to move the box. Machines tend
to be speciﬁc in tasks they can be used for, at least as compared to the general ability of
the human body to undertake simple mechanical tasks. This continues to be true even for
the now available computer-controlled machinery that is much more ﬂexible than equipment
from earlier years.
Next consider a complex task that might ordinarily be assigned to a skilled worker. It may
be possible to routinize this task so that an unskilled worker can do it, but only by incurring
setup costs. For example, suppose a software company needs employees to staﬀ a helpline.
The company could hire skilled computer experts who have general knowledge of computer
problems. Alternatively, the company could invest in routinizing the tasks, training relatively
unskilled workers to answer a narrow set of speciﬁc questions and developing a system for
routing calls. There is a large literature on de-skilling through Taylorist principles, and this
1phenomenon was thought to be particularly important in the early 20th century as unskilled
workers on assembly lines began to replace skilled artisans.1
To incorporate these ideas, we develop a model with the following features. To produce
output at any plant, a variety of tasks needs to be performed. The ﬁrm must decide which
inputs (capital, unskilled labor, or skilled labor) should do which tasks. Tasks vary in
complexity, and more complicated tasks require more setup costs. Skilled workers, with their
high level of general-purpose knowledge, have low setup costs. The setup costs of unskilled
workers are higher, and the setup costs of capital are higher still. Thus capital can be thought
of as an extreme form of unskilled labor.
In the optimal assignment of tasks, there is a partition. Skilled workers are assigned
complex tasks that would require extensive setup costs if undertaken by unskilled workers or
capital. Capital is assigned the relatively easy-to-master tasks such as those that involve the
movement of objects. Unskilled labor is assigned the in-between tasks. Thus on one margin
capital substitutes for unskilled labor, while on another margin unskilled labor substitutes
for skilled labor.
Our ﬁrst set of results concerns the relationship between factor allocation and plant size.
As we discuss further in Section 2, in today’s economy, employees of larger plants tend to
be more skilled than employees of smaller plants–a positive size-skill relationship. Larger
plants also are also more capital intensive–a positive size-capital relationship. These facts
have led researchers to develop theories of why large plants might have higher quality workers.
(See Oi and Idson (1999) for a survey.)
A century ago, the pattern was reversed. In the late 19th century and early 20th century,
the size-skill relationship was negative, as we document in Section 2. The substitution of
unskilled labor for skilled labor was a key characteristic of the mass production techniques
developed by industrialists such as Henry Ford. Large mass production factories were loaded
with unskilled workers, while small “craft” shops employed skilled artisans.
Historians know well that the size-skill relationship was negative in 1900. And labor
economists know well that the size-skill relationship is positive today. But no previous
1See, for example, Brown and Philips (1986). There is a literature in sociology that emphasizes the
de-skilling. See, in particular, Braverman (1974).
2analysis has tried to address both facts at the same time like we do here. In our theory,
the relationship can go either way. Larger plants tend to substitute capital for unskilled
labor and unskilled labor for skilled labor, because the larger scale makes it more worthwhile
to pay ﬁxed costs to lower marginal costs. Thus the net eﬀect of plant size on the skilled
labor share is ambiguous. We are able to derive a simple condition determining the direction
of the net eﬀect. We also examine how the size-capital relationship is determined, and we
connect this to the size-skill relationship: a positive size-skill relationship implies a positive
size-capital relationship. This is the pattern we observe in the latter part of the 20th century.
Our second set of results concerns capital-skill complementarity. Previous empirical work,
including Griliches (1969) and Krusell et al. (2000), has found that capital and skill are
complements. In this literature the production process is a “black box.” Constant elasticity
of substitution production functions are assumed to hold, and elasticities of substitution
are estimated. This paper provides micro foundations of the production process in which
capital-skill complementarity is derived. We ﬁnd that capital and unskilled labor tend to be
similar in a sense that will be clariﬁed in the paper.
Our third set of results concern the eﬀects of market expansion and productivity growth
on factor prices. These forces allow plants to expand in size to exploit economies of scale.
Chandler (1990) shows how lower transportation costs enabled ﬁrms in the late 19th century
to expand market areas and increase plant sizes. Section 2 shows that increases in output
per plant have been the broad trend in the 20th century as well. In our model, increases
in plant size driven by expansion of markets and growth have general equilibrium eﬀects on
factor prices. Increased scale makes it easier to substitute capital for unskilled labor (because
capital has higher setup costs), and this tends to raise the skill premium. But higher scale
also makes it easier to substitute higher-setup-cost unskilled labor for skilled labor, and this
tends to reduce the skill premium. The net eﬀect on the skill premium is ambiguous in
general.
Our main result connects the cross-section relationship between plant size and factor mix
with changes over time in the skill premium. It is intuitive that there should be a connection.
If larger plants employ relatively more skilled workers and macroeconomic changes lead to an
increase in average plant size, we might expect the relative demand for skilled labor to go up
3and the skill premium to increase. While this intuition is part of the story, it is incomplete,
and our analysis clariﬁes the precise connection between these two issues. We show that if the
size-skill relationship is negative, then the skill premium necessarily trends down. But the
skill premium also trends down even if the size-skill relationship is ﬂat. The skill premium
trends up only if the size-skill relationship is suﬃciently positive. The model has a bias
toward a falling skill premium because expansion of scale diminishes the importance of ﬁxed
cost, which is skilled’s advantage over unskilled.
Our results are consistent with the historical pattern. Goldin and Katz (2000) have
documented that the time pattern of the skill premium over the 20th century is roughly a
U-shape. Since the size-skill relationship was negative in the late 19th century, our theory
predicts the skill premium should have been falling, consistent with what happened. Since the
skill premium has risen in recent decades, the theory predicts that this size-skill relationship
should have been positive in recent decades, consistent with what happened.
Our analysis of changes over time in the skill premium is closely related to previous
work. Goldin and Katz (1998), Caselli (1999), Mobius (2000), and Mitchell (2001) all have
models where changes in technology lead ﬁr s tt oar e d u c t i o na n dt h e nt oa ni n c r e a s ei n
the skill premium. What distinguishes our work from this set of papers is our attempt to
connect changes in the skill premium to cross-section relationships between plants of varying
size. Furthermore, we show how the observed U-shaped pattern of the skill premium can be
generated in a model even when there is no technological change. Expansion of markets and
capital deepening, forces that raise plant size, are suﬃcient to obtain this result.
We note that an expansion of markets in our model is the same thing as an increase in
trade. The channel through which increased trade aﬀects the skill premium in our model
is very diﬀerent from the channel in the standard model, which is based on Hecksher-Ohlin
arguments. In our paper, we interpret trade as simply the merging of multiple, identical
countries, so it is simply a scaling up of market size. As a result, trade has no eﬀect on
the skill premium through the conventional channel. Here, trade allows plants to enjoy scale
economies, and as plants expand relative factor demands are aﬀected. This is consistent
with the plant level evidence from Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), who ﬁnd that
the increase in demand for skilled labor is within industries and not due to a reallocation
4across industries, as in Hecksher-Ohlin. Our analysis of the eﬀect of trade between similar
countries is similar in spirit to that of Acemoglu (2003), who also identiﬁes a channel (in
his case endogenous technological change) through which increases in market size aﬀect the
skill premium.
2 Supporting Evidence
This section provides supporting evidence for assertions made in the introduction.
2.1 The Size-Skill Relationship
Suppose for now that an individual’s pay can be used as a proxy for his or her skill. It is a well-
known and robust fact that in today’s economy larger plants have higher-paid workers (Brown
and Medoﬀ (1989)). It is not as well appreciated that the size-pay relationship has changed
over time. Using micro data from the Census of Manufactures over the 1963-1986 period,
Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) show there was a sharp upward trend in the relationship over
this period. Idson (2001) also reports recent increases. Atack, Bateman, and Margo (2000)
analyze Census micro data from the late 19th century and report a fundamentally diﬀerent
relationship between size and pay. In a simple linear regression of log wage on log size, they
ﬁnd a negative relationship. In a regression with a quadratic term, they ﬁnd an inverted
U-shaped relationship that is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing.
T h e s er e s u l t sa r ei l l u s t r a t e di nT a b l e1 . W eu s ee m p l o y m e n tt om e a s u r ep l a n ts i z e
because the Census Bureau has published data in this format in a consistent way over a long
period, enabling us to examine the long-run trend. To construct the table, we ﬁrst calculated
average pay for each plant-size category by dividing total payroll in the category by total
employment. For example, in the 1997 census, average pay calculated this way for plants
with 2,500 or more employees equaled $52,100. We then normalized by dividing through
by average pay in the entire manufacturing sector. The mean in 1997 was $33,900, so the
normalized wage in 1997 in the 2,500+ size category is 1.54=52.1/33.9, which is the ﬁgure
reported in the table. Thus average pay in the largest size category is 54 percent higher than
the average wage, a substantial premium.
5Going from left to right in the table, we move forward in time. Observe that for the
largest two size classes, the premium increases monotonically with time. Thus the table
replicates Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1991) previous ﬁndings that apply for the time period
beginning with the 1960s. But note there is also a substantial increase from 1947 to 1967 of
1.13 to 1.26. We conclude that the upward trend in the size-pay premium began well before
the 1960s.
The Census Bureau did not publish payroll by establishment size before 1947, so it is not
possible to use Census tabulations to extend the table before that year. However, if we go
back to 1880, we can use the 5 percent sample of the Census micro data collected by Atack
and Bateman (1999). These data were obtained from raw manuscript data that are publicly
available.2 These are the data used by Atack, Bateman, and Margo (2000) discussed above.
With these sample data, it is possible to estimate payroll and employment by size class and
extend the table to 1880, only we need to change the size groupings.3 Plants in 1880 were
dramatically smaller than today or in 1947, as the median in 1880 had only three employees.
This fact, combined with the fact that we have only a 5 percent sample, means there are
very few observations in some of the cells in the original groupings. To deal with this fact,
we have aggregated the larger size groupings and disaggregated the smallest grouping. With
these groupings, we have over 200 observations in each cell.4
The results in Table 2 illustrate the inverted U-shaped pattern reported by Atack, Bate-
man, and Margo (2000). Pay rises with size for very small plants, but then ﬂattens out over
the range from 20 to 100 to 110 percent of the average wage. Pay then falls to 5 percent
below the average pay, a drop of 15 percent. It is worth noting that if we were to look at the
larger plants for which we have relatively few observations, the drop is even larger. For the
50 plants with more than 250 employees, the average pay is 14 percent below the average.
2The raw Census data become publicly available 72 years after they are collected.
3Our aim here is to construct the variables for 1880 to make them as consistent as possible with the way
the comparable variables are constructed for the later years. The mean is employment weighted, just as it is
in the years. The mean also uses the sampling weights. (Atack and Bateman oversample small states.) We
use average annual employment in the denominator. Atack and Bateman make a correction for the number
of months the plant was operated. If we make this correction, it does not qualitatively aﬀect the results.
4The cell counts are 11,750, 770, 263, and 209.
6For the 15 plants with more than 500 employees, the average pay is 20 percent below the
average.
Our interest here is in the size-skill relationship. Pay may depend upon other factors
besides skill, so now we consider other measures of skill. Brown and Medoﬀ (1989) and
Troske (1999) both ﬁnd that adding controls for worker quality such as education reduces the
coeﬃcient on establishment size in a wage regression. This indicates plant size is correlated
with observable worker quality measures. Abowd and Kramarz (1999) use matched worker-
ﬁrm data and show that plant size is positively correlated with measures of worker quality.
All of these studies use data from the 1970s or later.
In empirical work, it is common to classify production workers as unskilled workers and
nonproduction workers as skilled workers. Table 3 presents nonproduction worker share by
plant size, normalized by average nonproduction worker share. In 1997, the share for plants
in the 2,500+ category was .405 while the average share was .282, so the normalized share
is 1.44 = .405/.282. In 1997 the share in the largest size class was substantially larger than
the average, but otherwise the relationship is relatively ﬂat. In 1987, 1977, and 1967, the
relationship is steep in the second highest class as well as the top class. There is a clear
pattern that this relationship has steepened over time.
In the 1880 data, there is no classiﬁcation by production/nonproduction worker status.
Employment is divided up by men, women, and children. Since women mainly worked as
production workers during this time period and since this is certainly true about children,
we expect the women/children share of employment to be positively correlated with the
production worker share. Table 2 shows that this share increases sharply with plant size,
with the largest plant having almost half of its workers being women and children.
Unlike the censuses before and after it, the 1890 census collected information that was
directly related to skills. Workers were classiﬁed into ﬁve categories based on the type
of work that they did. Three of these categories can be regarded as skilled work. These
include oﬃcers, clerks, and skilled workers. The other two categories, unskilled laborers and
pieceworkers, can be classiﬁed as unskilled. Unfortunately, micro data from the 1890 Census
is unavailable. However, state level data are published for nine important industries.5 For
5The tabulations are in Table 8 of U.S. Census (1895). The industries are Agricultural Implements, Boots
7each state we calculated the percentage of male workers in the state that were skilled workers
as well as the average employment size for plants in the state. Figure 1 plots these data points
for the carriage and wagon industry as well as a regression line. There is a strong negative
relationship. The R-squared of the regression is .54. An analogous pattern occurs in the
other industries. In eight out of nine industries, the regression line is negative, and in the
one case where it is not (the paper industry) the slope is not statistically signiﬁcant. If we
aggregate the data in a regression in logs with state and industry ﬁxed eﬀects, the estimated
elasticity of skill share with respect to average size is −.16 with a standard error of .02.
If we use average sales instead of average employment as a measure of size, the elasticity
falls somewhat to −.11 (standard error .02), but still continues to be quite high, especially
considering the large observed variations in plant size. Given the clean deﬁnition of skill
used here, we regard this as our strongest evidence that the size-skill relation was negative
in the late 19th century.
2.2 The Size-Capital Relationship
We turn now to the issue of capital intensity. It is a widely held view that large plants are
more capital-intensive than small plants. Table 4 provides evidence on this relationship. The
Census tabulations by establishment size do not report information about the stock of capital,
but they do report information about the ﬂow (that is, new investment). We constructed
Table 4 by ﬁrst dividing new capital expenditures by total employment to obtain a measure of
capital intensity and then normalizing this by the average capital intensity in manufacturing.
In 1997 this measure rises sharply with size. When we look at the other years, it is notable
that this series is not as smooth as the series in Table 1 and Table 3. Nonetheless, there is
a clear pattern that the size-capital relationship has steepened in recent years.
Table 2 illustrates the size-capital relationship using the micro data from the Atack-
Bateman sample. Here capital is measured by book value, and the normalization is as
before. The largest size class has the lowest ratio of capital to workers.
and Shoes, Carriages and Wagons, Dairy, Flour, Leather, Paper, Meatpacking, and Slaughtering. These
nine industries accounted for 10 percent of 1890 employment.
82.3 Increasing Plant Size
Chandler (1990) shows how expansion of markets in the late 19th century signiﬁcantly in-
creased plant sizes. Here we present evidence that plant sizes have increased through the
20th century.
Table 5 presents real value added per establishment for manufacturing plants in the
United States in millions of 2000 dollars for various years.6 In 1954 the mean manufacturing
plant had a value added of $2 million. By 1997, this had increased to $5.3 million, in real
terms. There is “upsizing” in the number of widgets that are coming out of the factory door.
As one might expect, if we look at particular industries, we can ﬁnd cases where the pattern
is ﬂat or even declining. But the overall pattern for most industries is an increase in output
per plant. Evidently, “eﬀective” inputs have been increasing at the average manufacturing
plant, and this is the concept of “size” that is relevant for our analysis.
While our theory is perhaps most applicable to the manufacturing sector, it is potentially
applicable to other sectors of the economy as well. Table 6 presents mean establishment
employment size for the broad sectors of the economy in the postwar period. The table illus-
trates the decline in mean manufacturing employment. Over the 1953 to 1997 period, mean
employment size in manufacturing fell 22 percent, and there was a fall in mining and trans-
portation of similar magnitude. But consider the retail and service sectors. These are huge
sectors, together accounting for over half of total employment in 1997. Mean employment
size in these two sectors grew at extremely high rates, 88 and 156 percent, respectively, and
this trend continues in the more recent data. When we also take into account the increases
in productivity in these sectors, we can safely conclude that increases in the quantity of
eﬀective inputs allocated at the establishment level have been the typical case throughout
the economy.
6The value added and establishment count data are from the Census of Manufacturers. The price deﬂator
are the producer price index. We use industry-level deﬂators for all years except 1923, for which we use the
broader industrial commodity deﬂator.
92.4 The Skill Premium
It is now well known that the skill premium has increased in recent decades (Katz and Murphy
(1992)). There is also a consensus among economic historians that the skill premium fell
during the late 19th century. Figure 2 shows the time series for the skill premium, measured
as the return to one year of college, over the 20th century. The data are from Goldin and
Katz (2000).7
We report the return to college because of the availability of a century-long series for it,
but the primary features of the series are consistent with other measures of the return to
skill and pay dispersion. For instance, the 90-10 or 80-20 wage ratio, looked at from the
perspective of studies on various parts of the century, are similar: a fall in premium in the
ﬁr s th a l fo ft h ec e n t u r y ,f o l l o w e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h el a s tq u a r t e ro ft h ec e n t u r y . T h e
return to high school, also reported in Goldin and Katz (2000) for the century, moves in a
very similar pattern.
3T h e M o d e l
A fundamental component of the model is the existence of setup costs. Given the scale
economies, the ﬁrms in our model have market power. In particular, ﬁrms sell diﬀerentiated
products. Some ﬁrms have more desirable products than other ﬁrms, introducing variation
in size across ﬁrms.
All ﬁrms face the same production technology. Each ﬁrm does a continuum of tasks that
are ranked by the degree of complexity. More complex tasks require more setup. There
are three inputs–capital, unskilled labor, and skilled labor–that are in ﬁxed supply to the
economy. These inputs vary in the setup cost required to undertake any particular task.
7The premium is calculated for young men, by comparing the wages of those completing exactly 12 years
of schooling to those completing exactly 16, and dividing by 4.
103.1 Preferences and Technology
A representative household consumes a continuum of diﬀerentiated products indexed by
u ∈ [0,m].T h e d i ﬀerentiated goods are aggregated to a composite good through a CES










Observe that the diﬀerentiated goods vary in the weight θ(u) > 0 that they enter the CES
function. Assume that higher u goods have higher weight, θ
0(u) ≥ 0.W i t ht h i ss p e c i ﬁcation,
a consumer will buy more of the higher u good than a lower u good if the two goods have
t h es a m ep r i c e .N o r m a l i z et h es c a l i n gs ot h a tθ(0) = 1.A s s u m eσ<1,s oﬁrms face inelastic
demand. We make this assumption for convenience, because it simpliﬁes the pricing formulas
(with inelastic demand ﬁrms limit price).8
The technology for producing each diﬀerentiated product is the same. There is a contin-
uum of tasks indexed by z on the unit interval z ∈ [0,1].L e tx(z) denote the level of activity










, if ω 6=1 (2)
=e x p (
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0
lnx(z)dz),i fω =1 . (3)
There are three factors of production indexed by j ∈ {1,2,3} in increasing order of skill.
Capital is j =1 , unskilled labor is j =2 , and skilled labor is j =3 . The total endowment
of factor j in the economy is Xj.
Undertaking each task entails a variable cost component and a ﬁxed cost component. The
variable cost is constant. Assume all three input types are equally eﬃc i e n ta tt h ev a r i a b l e
cost component in that one unit of the input is needed to undertake one unit of the task.





8We have also worked out the case where σ>1 and obtained similar results.
11is the total amount of task undertaken.
The three factors diﬀer in setup cost. Assume that type 3 has zero setup cost. Let φ2(z)
be the setup cost for type 2 and φ2(z)+φ1(z) be the setup cost of type 1, where φj(z) > 0
for z>0. Thus setting up factor 1 requires all the ﬁxed costs needed to set up factor 2 plus




j(z) > 0.( 4 )
Thus higher z goods require more setup. Higher z tasks are more complex.
The idea that capital has high ﬁxed costs is not controversial; indeed, it is common to
consider ﬁxed costs for capital but none for labor. The ﬁxed cost of capital has a natural
interpretation in this model. In order to be able to do a particular task, it is essential that
capital be designed for the task. A screwdriver is well designed for use on screws, but is not
very eﬀective on nails. The high ﬁxed cost reﬂects the speciﬁcity of capital.
While capital typically has high ﬁxed costs, we recognize that some capital is very scal-
able. A small plant might use a few computers and a large plant many, and the cost of this
hardware might be proportional to output. However, many types of capital are very spe-
cialized. Banks use similar computers but have specialized software, despite the seemingly
similar tasks that various banks undertake. Car plants use specialized equipment that is
produced speciﬁcally for the setup of the plant.
Less standard is the treatment of ﬁxed costs across diﬀerent skill levels of labor. What
we have in mind is that skills give workers general knowledge that allows them to move
between tasks easily. Unskilled workers must be taught to do each task, at relatively high
costs. Skilled workers can ﬁgure out how to do tasks without much diﬃculty. Another way
to interpret the assumption is that it implies that unskilled workers are relatively eﬃcient,
compared to skilled workers, when they have very specialized jobs. The routinization of jobs
on the assembly line allowed unskilled workers to be engaged where skilled workers had been
necessary. The narrow scope of each job meant that even unskilled workers could pick up
the necessary understanding to do the job properly.
Our analysis will depend heavily on an elasticity concept. Deﬁne the setup cost elasticity







This elasticity relates the percentage change in setup costs to the percentage change in the
1 − z tasks above z. If the setup cost takes the following functional form,
φj(z)=αj(1 − z)
−θj, (5)
then setup cost elasticity is constant, ηj(z)=θj. We will be interested in cases of both
constant and nonconstant setup cost elasticity.
3.2 The Cost Minimization Problem
Before deﬁning equilibrium, it is useful to study the cost minimization problem of a ﬁrm.
L e tt h en u m e r a i r eb et h ec o m p o s i t eg o o d ,a n dl e t(w1,w 2,w 3) be the vector of input prices.
Let wj denote the price of a unit of factor j in terms of the numeraire. Since factors have
identical productivity in the variable component of each task, but higher j factors have
uniformly lower setup costs, it must be the case that, in any equilibrium, w1 <w 2 <w 3.
Consider the cost minimization problem of a ﬁrm producing q units of output. The ﬁrm
must choose how much of each task z to undertake and which factor to employ at this task.
(Because of setup costs, each task is assigned to only one factor). Since the factors are
equally productive at the variable component but higher j have higher pay, higher j are
more costly in the variable component. But higher j have lower ﬁxed costs since φj(z) > 0,
so there is a trade-oﬀ. Since total setup increases in z, φ
0
j(z) ≥ 0, it is immediate that the
optimal assignment of tasks will consist of a pair of cutoﬀ rules (z1,z 2) such that factor 1
is assigned z<z 1, factor 2 is assigned z ∈ (z1,z 2), and factor 3 is assigned z>z 2.W i t h i n
each range, the intensity is constant. Let xj denote the intensity of factor j, in the range
where it is used.
It is useful to decompose the cost minimization problem into two parts. The ﬁrst part
takes as given that the ﬁrm uses cutoﬀs (z1,z 2) and determines the optimal mix across tasks.
Recall that aside from the setup cost, the production function for the diﬀerentiated product
is the constant returns CES form (2). Fixing (z1,z 2) and given constant returns conditional
on these cutoﬀs, the cost minimizing input mix does not depend upon q.L e t˜ xj be the cost
13minimizing level at which to operate those tasks assigned to factor j to produce a single unit
of output. The demand ˜ xj is implicitly a function of the pay and the cutoﬀs. The per unit
input demands satisfy the following problem:
˜ c(z1,z 2) ≡ min
{(x1,x2,x3) such that q=1}
[z1x1w1 +( z2 − z1)x2w2 +( 1− z2)x3w3]. (6)
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3 ,i fω =1 .
Note that the minimized cost per unit is written as a function of the cutoﬀs but it also




for j ∈ {1,2}. Increasing the cutoﬀ zj replaces input j +1with input j, which is less costly
and equally productive in the variable component of the task. Thus increasing the cutoﬀ
lowers the variable cost per unit.
The second part of the cost minimization problem is to choose the cutoﬀs z.G i v e n a










Observe that the ﬁrm pays φ2(z) on all tasks done by either 1 or 2. In addition, it must pay
φ1(z) on all tasks done by 1. Given output level q,t h eﬁrm chooses z1 and z2 to minimize
the sum of variable costs plus setup costs:
c(q)=m i n
z1,z2 q˜ c(z1,z 2)+f (z1,z 2). (9)
This is a strictly convex problem since ˜ c(z1,z 2) is convex and f (z1,z 2) is strictly convex




+ φj(zj)=0 .( 1 0 )
14The ﬁrst term is the reduction in variable cost from increasing zj, weighted by output q.
The second term φj(zj) is the marginal increment in total ﬁxed cost f from shifting task zj
away from factor j +1to factor j.
For later use, we rewrite the ﬁrst-order necessary condition for the choice of cutoﬀ zj.I n
the Cobb-Douglas case (ω =0 ), the cost function can be written as








So the slope is
∂˜ c
∂zj
=˜ c[lnwj − lnwj+1].( 1 1 )
In the Cobb-Douglas case, total expenditure on each task is the same. With a unit measure of
tasks, total expenditure overall must equal expenditure on any individual task. In particular,
it equals that on a task assigned to factor 3,
q˜ c = w3x3. (12)
Substituting (11) and (12) into the ﬁrst-order condition (10) for the choice of zj yields
w3x3 [lnwj − lnwj+1]+φj(zj)=0 . (13)














+ φj(zj)=0 .( 1 4 )
3.3 Equilibrium
Before discussing equilibrium, we ﬁrst note a consequence of our assumption that for factor
3 (skilled labor), there is no setup cost for any task. If one unit of skilled labor were
equally divided across all the tasks, one unit of output would result. With no setup costs,
producing output in this way is constant returns to scale, and the cost per unit of output is
w3. We assume that this constant returns avenue for obtaining output is freely available to
consumers.
9This derivation, contained in the Appendix, uses the marginal rate of substitution condition to write x1
and x2 as functions of w3 and x3.
15Now consider the behavior of producers. There is a single producer of each diﬀerentiated
good u. A producer cannot charge consumers a price greater than w3 since consumers would
use the constant returns alternative just discussed to obtain the product at a cost of w3 per
unit. By the assumption that σ<1, demand is inelastic for prices below w3.H e n c e ,i t i s
immediate that producers will set a limit price up to the consumer’s reservation price of w3;
that is, p(u)=w3 for each diﬀerentiated product.
We exploit this structure of a constant limit price across all products to simplify our
deﬁnition of an equilibrium. For simplicity of the deﬁnition, deﬁne nj(u) to be the number
of tasks that the producer of product u assigns factor j:
n1(u) ≡ z1(u)
n2(u) ≡ z2(u) − z1(u)
n3(u) ≡ 1 − z2(u).
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is a list of functions (p(u),q(u),z j(u), xj(u)) and factor prices
wj such that the following conditions hold.
(1) Limit Pricing: p(u)=w3.
(2) Marginal Rate of Substitution Condition: q(u)=θ(u)σq(0).
(3) Cost Minimization:
(z1(u),z 2(u)) = argminz1,z2 q(u)˜ c(z1,z 2,w 1,w 2,w 3)+f (z1,z 2)
xj(u)=q(u)˜ xj(z1(u),z 2(u),w 1,w 2,w 3).












(5) Factor Market Clearing:
R m
0 nj(u)xj(u)du = ¯ Xj,f o re a c hj.




f(z1(u),z 2(u))du = ¯ X1w1 + ¯ X2w2 + ¯ X3w3 + Π.
16Condition (2) follows from consumer utility maximization. It is the marginal rate of
substitution condition between good u a n dg o o d0 . ( R e c a l lθ(0) = 1 and that prices p(u)
are constant for all u.) Since it is optimal for ﬁrms to set the limit price, the analysis of the
ﬁrm’s problem reduces to minimizing the cost of producing the quantity demanded at the
limit price. This is condition (3). Conditions (4), (5), and (6) are market clearing conditions.
The left-hand side of the household’s budget constraint (6) reﬂects the fact that households
consume all of the ﬁnal good output (Q) except that used in the production of ﬁxed costs.
Proﬁts from the diﬀerentiated goods ﬁrms are denoted Π.
It is easy to derive an explicit formula for the diﬀerentiated product price p (and also w3
since p = w3). Let ˜ q(u) be the cost minimizing quantity of diﬀerentiated good u required to
produce a single unit of the composite. From the marginal rate of substitution condition,

















































We next present our result for the existence of an equilibrium. Here we restrict attention
to the case where there are a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent product types.
Proposition 1 Suppose the set {θ(u),u∈ [0,m]} is ﬁnite. An equilibrium exists.
Proof. See the Appendix.
174 Factor Allocation and Plant Size
In this section we consider the relationship between plant size and factor allocation. In
this economy, more desirable goods (higher u)h a v eh i g h e rq.A l l ﬁrms in the economy
face the same wages and have access to the same technology. So in order to study how
factor allocation depends upon plant size, we need to study how the cost-minimizing factor
demands vary with q.
Our ﬁrst step is to determine how the cutoﬀs z1 and z2 vary with plant size. The two









Our result is the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the solution to the cost minimization problem (9), z1 and z2 both increase
in q.










=0 .( 1 7 )


















2 > 0, (18)
where H is the Hessian, |H| > 0, and where the ﬁrst-order necessary condition is used to










1 > 0.( 1 9 )
An increase in the target quantity q places more weight on the beneﬁto fc o s tr e d u c t i o nf o r
increasing the cutoﬀs. So it is intuitive that a higher q would increase the optimal cutoﬀs.
18With greater economies of scale, a larger ﬁrm substitutes capital for unskilled labor and
unskilled labor for skilled labor.
Deﬁne the size-skill relation as the ratio of the demand for skilled and unskilled workers














Observe that the ratio of intensities x3
x2 i st h es a m ef o rﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes because this
depends upon the ratio of factor prices through (7), the same for all ﬁrms. Thus to under-
stand how the skill ratio varies with q, we need only look at the behavior of the ratio of
numbers of tasks assigned.
It is immediate that there are two conﬂicting forces at work. Higher q raises z1, so capital
replaces unskilled workers. It raises z2, so unskilled workers replace skilled. The net eﬀect
on the size-skill relationship is ambiguous. It turns out to depend upon a simple comparison
of the elasticity of setup costs, as demonstrated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The slope s0(q) of the size-skill relationship is positive, zero, or negative as
η2(q) is greater than, equal to, or less than η1(q).




















Substituting in (18) and (19) and multiplying by q|H|,t h es l o p es0(q) has the sign of
φ1φ
0
2(1 − z2) − φ2φ
0
1(1 − z1)
or, dividing by φ1φ2,
η2 − η1.
19It is intuitive that the relative setup cost elasticities should play a crucial role. If η1 is
small relative to η2, it is relatively cheaper to shift the z1 margin (capital replacing unskilled
labor) than the z2 margin (unskilled labor replacing skilled) so the size-skill relationship
increases. Note that our model does not have an unambiguous prediction for the size-skill
relationship, which gives it a chance to replicate the experience of the changes from the late
19th century to the late 20th century.




















where Xj, xj,a n dzj are all implicitly functions of q. The relationship speciﬁes how the ratio
of capital to total labor (unskilled plus skilled) varies with plant size. Again there are two
oﬀsetting eﬀects. The measure of tasks z1 assigned to capital increases with plant size, and
this tends to increase the ratio k. B u tt h ei n c r e a s ei nt h ez2 cutoﬀ tends to decrease the
ratio k. Unskilled labor is cheap compared to skilled labor, w2 <w 3, so tasks assigned to
unskilled labor are operated at a relatively high intensity, x2 >x 2.A sz2 is increased and
tasks are transferred from skilled to unskilled labor, this factor increases the denominator in
k.
If it is diﬃcult to substitute unskilled for skilled (η2 large), then z2 won’t increase much,
and we expect the second oﬀsetting eﬀect to be small. This suggests the possibility of another
result that compares η2 and η1. Our result is the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The size-capital relationship k(q) strictly increases if η2(q) ≥ η1(q).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note this is not an if and only if result like before. A positive size-skill relationship η2 >η 1
implies a positive size-capital relationship, but a negative size-skill relationship does not
imply a negative size-capital relationship. In fact, in the limiting case of Leontief, x3 = x2,
the oﬀsetting intensity eﬀect drops out and the size-capital relationship is always positive.
Note that in the late 20th century, both the size-capital and the size-skill relationships were
strongly positive; the model connects these facts.
205F a c t o r P r i c e s
This section examines the impact of changes in the stock of endowments on factor prices.
We use the analysis to examine two issues. First, we consider the issue of capital-skill
complementarity. Second, we examine the impact of market expansion and productivity
growth on the skill premium.
To make the general equilibrium analysis as simple as possible, we examine the limiting
case where all plants are the same size. By continuity, our results apply when plant sizes
diﬀer, but a suﬃciently large amount of the probability weight is concentrated near a par-
ticular plant size type. We also assume that the total measure of products is m =1 ,s ot h a t
p =1from formula (15) and therefore w3 =1 .
To simplify the presentation of this section, we assume ω ≥ 1.T h eω<1 analysis is the
same except that case requires us to take into account the possibility of a corner solution
where all of factor 1 or 2 is completely disposed of. With ω ≥ 1, things are simpler since all
factor prices will be strictly positive and there is no disposal.
5.1 The Demand for Capital
This subsection presents some preliminary results that we use in the next two subsections. It
provides the details of how an equilibrium is constructed for the one-type case. We simplify
the general equilibrium analysis down to a simple equation that has a natural interpretation
as demand equating supply for capital.
Let z1 and z2 denote the cutoﬀs of the representative ﬁrm. We will construct an equi-
librium by beginning with an arbitrary z2 and derive the equilibrium demand for capital
ˆ D1(z2) that is consistent with this level of z2. We then compare demand to the exogenous
supply X1. An equilibrium is where demand equals supply, ˆ D1(z2)=X1. This demand-
equals-supply condition will prove useful for the analysis of general equilibrium eﬀects, since
there is a close relationship between the skill premium and the equilibrium z2.
Given a cutoﬀ z2 and given that in any equilibrium factor 3 is equally distributed among






which we write as an explicit function of z2. Substituting this into the ﬁrst-order necessary










.( 2 0 )
Observe our assumption that ω ≥ 1 implies that 0 < ˆ w2(z2) < 1 for all z2.
Next we back out the z1 that is implied by the marginal technical rate of substitution






But given that a measure 1−z2 of tasks are assigned to factor 3 and z2 −z1 to factor 2, the







2.( 2 1 )
Solving this leads to an expression for z1 as a function of z2,






O b s e r v et h i si sn e g a t i v ea tz2 =0 . It is also immediate that
lim





2 =m a x{z2: such that ˆ z1(z2)=0 }.
Observe that ˆ z1(z2) > 0,f o ra l lz2 >z ◦
2. This is the range of z2 that we will consider.
The next step is to determine the level of w1 that is implied by the ﬁrst-order condition











,( 2 3 )
which satisﬁes 0 < ˆ w1(z2) < ˆ w2(z2),g i v e nω ≥ 1.
22Having determined all this, we can calculate the intensity used by factor 1,
ˆ x1(z2)=ˆ x3(z2)ˆ w1(z2)
−ω.
Putting this all together leads to what we call the demand for capital given z2,
ˆ D1(z2)=ˆ z1ˆ x1 (24)
=ˆ z1ˆ x3 ˆ w
−ω
1 .
At this point we make two observations. First, by deﬁnition of the cutoﬀ z◦
2, ˆ D1(z◦
2)=0 .
Second, since z1 goes to 1 and w1 is bounded above by 1, and since ˆ x3 goes to inﬁnity, the




These two observations and continuity of ˆ D1(z2) imply an equilibrium exists where demand
equals supply,
ˆ D1(z2)=X1.
If demand ˆ D1(z2) is everywhere upward sloping in z2, the equilibrium is unique. It is
intuitive that it should be upward sloping. An increase in z2 means fewer tasks are assigned
to factor 3, increasing work for the other two factors. For the case of constant setup cost
elasticity given by equation (5), we can show that if η1 ≥ 1 and η2 ≥ 1,t h e nd e m a n di ss t r i c t l y
monotonic. Figure 3 illustrates this for the parameters η1 = η2 =1and ¯ X2 = ¯ X3 =1 .10
The demand curve as well as two supply curves are illustrated. Observe that if the supply of
capital ¯ X1 =1 , then the equilibrium z2 = .35. Skilled labor undertakes a fraction 1−z2 = .65
of all the tasks, but accounts for only 1
3 =
¯ X3
¯ X1+ ¯ X2+ ¯ X3 of the labor stock. The other two factors
are concentrated in disproportionately fewer tasks to keep setup costs low.
While an upward sloping relationship appears to be the typical case, for extreme para-
meters it is possible to construct examples where a portion of the demand relationship is
nonmonotonic. Figure 4 is an example with η1 = η1 = .01 and α1 = α2 =3 0where this
occurs. In such a case, depending on where the supply line cuts, there may be multiple
equilibria. If there are multiple equilibria, there will be at least one irregular equilibrium
10The multiplicative constant for setup cost is α1 = α2 =1 .
23where demand cuts supply from above as well regular equilibria where demand cuts supply
from below. For our comparative statics analysis, we will strict attention only to regular
equilibria:






in addition to ˆ D1(ze
2)= ¯ X3.
This is analogous to a stability condition. Note a regular equilibrium will always exist.
In our comparative statics analysis, in the neighborhood of regular equilibrium ze
2, we will
assume a continuous equilibrium selection around ze
2. Our comparative statics results are
meant to be interpreted as local results.
We consider comparative statics with three model parameters, ¯ X1, ¯ X2,a n dap a r a m e t e r
λ that scales up all the inputs in a proportionate way,
¯ Xj = λξj,
for a vector of constants (ξ1,ξ2,ξ3). We have in mind two interpretations of the scaling
parameter λ. First, an increase in trade possibilities is equivalent to an increase in λ.I f
two separate identical economies are merged by the expansion of trade, it is identical to a
doubling of λ. Second, an increase in total factor productivity is equivalent to an increase
in λ.
The next result is critical for the subsequent analysis.
Proposition 5 Let ze
2 be the cutoﬀ in a regular equilibrium. It strictly increases in (i) the
capital stock ¯ X1, (ii) the stock of unskilled labor ¯ X2, or (iii) an increase in the scaling λ of
all three factors (that is, trade or productivity growth).
Proof. (i) Since demand ˆ D1(z2) is upward sloping in a regular equilibrium, it is immedi-
ate that z2 increases in ¯ X1. (ii) Fixing z2, the function ˆ z1(z2,X2) in (22) strictly decreases in
X2.T h i si m p l i e st h a t ˆ w1(z2,X2) from (23) strictly increases in X2 using φ
0
1(z) > 0.H e n c e
ˆ D1(z2,X2) strictly decreases in X2. This shift down in ˆ D1 increases the equilibrium z2. (iii)





















In equilibrium adjusted demand equals adjusted supply. Since adjusted supply is a constant,
it is suﬃcient to show that d AD1(z2,λ) decreases in λ.O b s e r v eﬁrst that ﬁxing z2, ˆ w2(z2,λ)
in (20) strictly increases in λ. From (22), ˆ z1(z2,λ) strictly decreases in λ.S i n c eφ
0
1(z1) > 0
by assumption, all results imply that ˆ w1(z2,λ) in (23) strictly increases in λ. Together, these
results imply that d AD1(z2,λ) is strictly decreasing in λ.
It is intuitive that as the stock of either capital ¯ X1 or unskilled labor ¯ X2 increases, z2
increases so that the number of tasks 1 − z2 done by skilled labor decreases. Indeed, the
eﬀect of an increase in capital is immediate in the supply and demand curve in Figure 3.
If all factors increase proportionately, the number of tasks 1 − z2 done by skilled labor also
decreases. Skilled labor is allocated a disproportionate number of tasks to save on ﬁxc o s t s .
As the scale of the economy increases, this disadvantage of capital and unskilled relative to
skilled labor decreases.
5.2 Capital-Skill Complementarity
We deﬁne capital and skill as complements if an increase in X1 lowers the equilibrium value
of w2. Recall that w3 =1 ,s oad e c r e a s ei nw2 corresponds to a decrease in the relative pay
of unskilled labor or an increase in the skill premium.
From Proposition 5, an increase in capital ¯ X1 raises the cutoﬀ z2.F r o m i n s p e c t i o n o f
formula (20), it is immediate that ˆ w2(z2) increases in z2 if and only if (1 − z2)φ2(z2) increases
in z2. In turn, this occurs if and only if the setup elasticity exceeds unity, η2(z2) > 1.W e
conclude the following.
Proposition 6 Capital and skill are complements if and only if η2(z2) > 1.
Recall from Proposition 5 that z2 increases in ¯ X2 as well as ¯ X1. Moreover, like ¯ X1, ¯ X2
does not directly enter the formula ˆ w2(z2). Hence, the direction of the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s e
in ¯ X2 on w2 is the same as the direction of the eﬀect of an increase in ¯ X1. We conclude the
following.
25Proposition 7 Capital and skill are complements if and only if w2 decreases in the supply
of unskilled labor ¯ X2.
It is possible in this model for an increase in the supply of unskilled labor to raise the
price of unskilled labor. This happens because greater supply allows for scale economies that
can attenuate unskilled labor’s disadvantage of high ﬁxed cost relative to skilled labor. In
such a case, capital and skilled labor are substitutes. But if an increase in the supply of
unskilled labor lowers its own price, capital and skilled labor are complements. To the extent
this intuitively plausible condition is the empirically relevant one, our theory is consistent
with the ﬁndings of capital-skill complementarity in the literature (for example, Griliches
(1969), Krusell et al. (2000)).
5.3 Market Expansion and Growth
We now turn to the eﬀect on the skill premium of scaling up all factors proportionately by
increasing the parameter λ.T h ee ﬀect of increased trade on the skill premium depends in
l a r g em e a s u r eo nt h es h a p eo ft h es e t u pc o s tf u n c t i o n s .W h e nλ increases, there are more
resources available to produce the ﬁxed set of products. As a result, plants grow, which tends
to make ﬁrms want to substitute capital for unskilled labor and unskilled labor for skilled
labor. The change in the demand for unskilled labor (relative to skilled labor) depends on
how costly it is, in terms of the φ functions, to substitute at the two margins z1 and z2.
Our earlier analysis showed that the size-skill relationship provided information about the
relative shapes of φ1 and φ2. Our next result ties this together.
Proposition 8 Suppose at given market size λ
◦ the size-skill relationship is nonpositive.
Then in market size λ around λ
◦ strictly increases w2, so the skill premium falls.
Proof. We will show that if w2 does not strictly increase in λ around λ
◦,t h e nη1(z◦
1) <
η2(z◦
2) must hold. Proposition 3 then implies that the size-skill relationship must be strictly
positive, which is suﬃcient to prove the claim.
We begin with some preliminaries. First, we show that z1 must strictly increase. Recall
formula (22) for z1:


























This is strictly positive since dz2
dλ > 0 from Proposition 5 and since dw2
dλ ≤ 0 by hypothesis.
Since both z1 and z2 strictly increase, it is then immediate from a formula analogous to (21)
for wω



























The weak inequality follows from diﬀerentiating (25) and using the fact that w2 is weakly
decreasing by hypothesis. The second line substitutes in wω
2 from (21).
We now turn to the main step of the proof. From (14), the two ﬁrst-order necessary




































Since w2 weakly decreases while w1 strictly increases, the left-hand side must strictly increase.












A rearrangement including multiplying through by (1 − z2) yields
















≤ η2(z2) − η1(z1),
where the weak inequality uses (26).
27This result provides a link between the size-skill relationship and the eﬀect of market
expansion and growth on the skill premium. In particular, a negative or zero size-skill
relationship implies that expansion of markets reduces the skill premium. Chandler (1990)
argues that in the late 19th century, the expansion of markets brought about by advances
in transportation led ﬁrms to increase plant size and adopt mass production technologies.
Goldin and Katz (1998) argue that the advent of mass production led to reductions in the skill
premium. Our theory connects these two separate points, using the size-skill relationship to
draw the connection. The negative size-skill relationship of the late 19th century was a signal
that expansion of markets would necessarily have a negative impact on the skill premium.
For some parameters of our model, an expansion of markets can increase the skill pre-
mium, as we discuss in the numerical example below. When that happens, our result above
tells us that the size-skill relationship must be strictly positive. The process of market ex-
pansion has continued throughout the 20th century. The positive size-skill relationship that
has become increasingly steep implies that the eﬀect of an expansion of markets today on
the skill premium may be positive.
6A n E x a m p l e
This section presents a particular example of our model that exhibits the broad trends that
we discussed in the introduction. The example is meant to capture the following scenario.
In the late 19th century, mechanical tasks such as those involved in the manufacture of a
vehicle were undertaken by both unskilled workers and craftsmen who were highly trained
and who were considered skilled workers. As market size expanded, it was relatively easy
to substitute unskilled workers for skilled workers at these mechanical tasks. Over time,
unskilled workers pushed skilled workers out of mechanical tasks altogether; skilled workers
shifted entirely to working on nonmechanical tasks like management. While in come cases
it may be possible to substitute unskilled for skilled workers in these “brain tasks” (like
the computer helpline discussed in the introduction), in general this substitution is quite
diﬃcult. As a result, unskilled labor today is faring relatively poorly on its two fronts. In its
rear front where it competes with capital, it is losing out as capital displaces its mechanical
28tasks. But in its forward front where it competes with skilled labor, it is unable to displace
skilled labor at management-like tasks.
In this example, we keep the technology the same, including the φj functions. We also
hold ﬁxed the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers. We recognize that there have
been major technological changes over the course of a century that would aﬀect the φ1 and
φ2 functions and that these changes would aﬀect the skill premium. We also recognize that
there have been changes in the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers through schooling and
that these changes would aﬀect the skill premium. Our intent here is to abstract from these
well-known forces so that we can focus on the potential role of market expansion and capital
deepening in accounting for the observed patterns.








for γ>0 and κ>0. Here, skilled and unskilled labor grow at the same rate γ so the ratio
stays ﬁxed. Capital grows at a higher rate that exceeds labor by an amount κ.W ev i e wt h e
γ parameter as capturing the force of market expansion; the κ parameter captures capital
deepening.
The speciﬁcation of the setup cost functions is crucial for determining the dynamics. If
we were to choose the constant elasticity speciﬁcation (5) for both φ1 and φ2,P r o p o s i t i o n3
would then imply the sign of the size-skill relationship would be constant over time. We would
have no hope of capturing the switch in sign, from negative to positive, that has occurred in
the data. This leads us to adopt the following nonconstant elasticity speciﬁcation of φ2,
φ2(z)=α2(1 − z − β2)
−θ2,




1 − z − β2
#
, (27)
29which increases in z and goes to inﬁnity as z goes to 1 − β. This captures the idea that as
we move up in the hierarchy of tasks, it becomes increasingly more diﬃcult to substitute
skilled for skilled labor. The set of tasks [1 − β,1] at the top of the complexity scale can be
thought of as management tasks that only skilled workers are capable of doing.
For simplicity, we assume that φ1 takes the constant elasticity form (5). Having the
elasticity of φ2 change relative to that of φ1 is enough to drive the patterns we will exhibit
in the model.
As t goes to inﬁnity, the quantity of each factor gets arbitrarily large, since γ>0.
Moreover, capital’s share of the productive units gets arbitrarily large, since κ>0.H e n c e ,
z2(t) must approach 1 − β.A s w e g o b a c k i n t i m e a n d t goes to minus inﬁnity, it is clear





Then if we go back far enough in time, η2(t) <η 1 = θ1. From Proposition 3, the size-skill
relationship is negative. From Proposition 8, the eﬀect of the market expansion (γ)o nt h e
skill premium is negative. In addition, since η2(0) < 1,t h ee ﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nc a p i t a l
on the skill premium is negative, from Proposition 6. Thus far enough back in time the skill
premium is falling.
The setup elasticity η2 for factor 2 given by (27) strictly increases over time and goes
to inﬁnity. There is a critical time period ˆ t where η2 = η1. Before this point the size-skill
relationship is positive; after this point it is negative. There is also a point where η2 exceeds
unity. From Proposition 6, capital and skill are complements after this point in time. In
simulations of numerical examples we have found that far enough into the future the skill
premium increases in market size. Unskilled labor bangs into the constraint that it cannot
cut management jobs. But expansion of markets enables capital to cut into tasks done by
unskilled workers.
Figure 5 plots the evolution over time of factor allocations, the skill premium (deﬁned by
(w3 − w2)/w2), where the elasticity εs ≡
s0(q)q
s(q) , and the size-capital elasticity εk is deﬁned in
the analogous way. The numerical example satisﬁes the restrictions above. The monotonic
increase over time in the size-skill relationship and the U-shape of the skill premium is a
30robust pattern across various parameter values satisfying these restrictions. Note that at the
bottom of the U where the skill premium begins to rise, the size-skill relationship is strictly
positive (as must be the case from Proposition 8). This pattern is consistent with the U.S.
experience, as the size-skill relationship was small, but strictly positive at midcentury. (See
Tables 1 and 3.)
In general, the size-capital relationship can increase or decrease over time for parameters
satisfying the above restrictions. In the example illustrated, the size-capital relationship
increases. This example matches the pattern in the U.S. data.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have introduced a model of task assignment at the plant level. Increased scale of pro-
duction makes it worthwhile to substitute capital for unskilled labor and unskilled labor for
skilled labor. The model delivers several empirically relevant results. It connects the positive
size-skill relationship and positive size-capital relationship of the late 20th century to each
other, it connects capital-skill complementarity to the positive size-skill relationship, and it
connects the eﬀect of market expansion on the skill premium to the size-skill relationship.
The model is ﬂexible enough to account for the ends of two centuries while at the same
time connecting time series movements to observable cross-section implications. Indeed, as
we showed in the last section, the model is even capable of delivering the qualitative trends
without any changes in technology, but simply through changes in the stock of inputs.
We do not discount the importance of changes in technology; surely, for instance, the
advent of computer controlled machines has made capital more ﬂexible, lowering its ﬁxed
cost. But our model has made implicit statements about that, as well: to the extent that
capital has become more ﬂexible, so that it can substitute more readily for unskilled workers,
there will be an increased chance that the size-skill relationship will be positive, implying a
positive size-capital relationship; capital and skills will be complements, and increased trade
may no longer be the force for a falling skill premium that it was before. All of this is
consistent with the recent evidence. Taking these ideas of technological change to the data
in a more quantitative way is a future direction where the model could be put to use.
318 Appendix: Proofs
Calculations for Section 3
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Suppose there is a ﬁn i t es e to fp r o d u c tt y p e si n d e x e db y
i ∈ {1,2,...,I},a n dl e tθ
i be the weight of product i and mi the mass of products of this
type. Let zi






2) be the vector of




for j ∈ {1,2},i∈ {1,2,...,I}. Clearly, Z is compact.
32Start with an arbitrary ˆ z ∈ Z. Deﬁne ˆ ni
j to be the associated measures of tasks performed




2 − ˆ zi
1, ˆ ni
3 =1−zi
2.F o rˆ z such that ˆ ni
j > 0 for all i and































































1 =1 . Observe that in any equilibrium, given the CES production function, the
ratio of intensities across a ﬁrm of type i and a ﬁrm of type 1 is a constant ratio across
factors. The ﬁrst condition above imposes this constant ratio. The construction determines
the input vectors that satisfy this constant ratio, as well as conditions (1), (2), (4), and (5)
in the deﬁnition of an equilibrium.
Denote the intensity levels by xi
j(ˆ z), a continuous function by the implicit function the-
orem. Extend this to all of Z by taking the limit of the continuous x
j
j(ˆ z). Compute w1(ˆ z)








for w3 = p where p is deﬁned by (15).
Next, solve the cost-minimization problem for type i,
z
i(w1,w 2)=a r g m i n
0≤z1≤z2≤1q
i˜ c(z1,z 2;w1,w 2)+f(z1,z 2),
where ˜ c i st h eu n i tc o s tf u n c t i o nd e ﬁned in (6). Since the problem is strictly convex and
continuous, the solutions zi(w1,w 2) are continuous functions.
Deﬁne
z
∗(ˆ z) ≡ z
1(w1(ˆ z),w 2(ˆ z)) × z
2(w1(ˆ z),w 2(ˆ z)) × .... × z
I(w1(ˆ z),w 2(ˆ z)).
Since this is a continuous function on a compact set, there is a ﬁxed point ˆ z ∈ z∗(ˆ z).C o n -
struct (qi,p i,w j, zi
j, xi




this satisﬁes conditions (1) through (5) of equilibrium whenever ˆ ni
j > 0 for all i and j.N o t i c e
that, if ˆ ni
j =0 ,a n yxi
j will maintain market clearing (since it is always multiplied by zero),
so the ﬁxed point is an equilibrium in those cases as well. The household’s budget constraint
(6) holds by Walras law.
























We will show that η2 ≥ η1 implies that the ﬁrst term is positive, which will complete the























Using the formulas for dz1
dq and dz2
dq , it follows that the ﬁrst term of (34) is strictly positive.
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37Table 1
Payroll per Employee by Establishment Size and Year




1947 1954 1967 1977 1987 1997
1-99 .91 .86 .88 .85 .82 .85
100-249 .96 .94 .89 .87 .89 .92
250-499 .98 .96 .91 .89 .92 .95
500-999 1.01 1.02 .98 .99 1.02 1.02
1,000-2499 1.05 1.09 1.09 1.14 1.20 1.20
2,500+ 1.13 1.19 1.26 1.39 1.48 1.54
Source:  Authors’ calculations from tabulations by establishment size in U.S. Census
(1950, 1957, 1971, 1981, 1993, 2001).Table 2
Plant Characteristics by Plant Size














1-19 .98 .09 1.07
20-49 1.10 .19 1.30
50-99 1.10 .25 1.27
100+ .95 .40 .74
Source: Authors’ calculations with the Atack-Bateman sample data discussed in Atack
and Bateman (1999).Table 3
Nonproduction Worker Share by Establishment Size and Year
(Normalized relative to average across all establishment sizes)
Employment
Size
Category 1947 1954 1967 1977 1987 1997
1-99 1.03 .95 .86 .92 .92 .96
100-249 .94 .94 .93 .92 .90 .95
250-499 .92 .94 .90 .92 .89 .93
500-999 .95 .99 .96 1.01 .93 .94
1,000-2499 1.05 1.04 1.09 1.10 1.12 1.03
2,500+ 1.07 1.14 1.27 1.21 1.42 1.44
Source:  Authors’ calculations from tabulations by establishment size in U.S. Census
(1950, 1957, 1971, 1981, 1993, 2001).Table 4
Normalized Capital Intensity by Establishment Size and Year
(Normalized relative to average across all establishment sizes)
Employment
Size
Category 1954 1967 1977 1987 1997
1-99 .75 .91 .77 .63 .61
100-249 .92 .84 .91 .84 .88
250-499 .91 .87 .96 .93 1.03
500-999 1.11 1.09 .97 1.20 1.20
1,000-2499 1.39 1.16 1.41 1.50 1.65
2,500+ 1.11 1.17 1.24 1.55 1.54
Source:  Authors’ calculations from tabulations by establishment size in U.S. Census
(1957, 1971, 1981, 1993, 2001).Table 5
Value Added per Estabslishment
Manufacturing Plants
(Millions of 2000 dollars)
Industry 1923 1954 1967 1977 1987 1997
All Manufacturing 1.0 2.0 4.1 3.5 4.3 5.3
Food Processing 0.3 1.2 2.7 3.8 7.3 7.5
Textiles and Apparel 0.5 0.6 1.4 1.7 2.3 2.9
Chemicals 1.4 3.8 8.8 10.7 14.2 17.5
Rubber 4.7 4.5 3.2 3.0 3.7 4.9
Leather 1.0 1.7 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.9
Non-metallic Mineral
Products
1.0 1.8 2.4 2.5 2.7 3.2
Metals and Metal Products 2.3 3.0 4.3 3.7 3.4 2.9
Transportation 3.6 11.2 13.6 14.1 16.7 17.9
Source:  Authors’ calculations from tabulations by establishment size in U.S. Census
























4.7 5.4 6.2 0.01 31
Mining 29.8 29.9 21.9 0.01 −27
Construction 9.0 8.1 8.3 0.05 −9




27.3 24.2 20.8 0.06 −24
Wholesale
Trade
11.9 12.2 12.8 0.06 8




8.5 11.1 10.9 0.07 29
Services 5.7 11.4 14.7 0.35 156
Source:  Authors’ calculations from U.S. Census (1955, 1977, 1999).Figure 1
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